Armenia-Turkey relations ‘totally frozen' – expert

Tert.am has interviewed Suren Sargsyan, a graduate and research scholar of the Tuft University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, who shared his comments on the the Armenia-Turkey relations and the recent developments around Nagorno-Karabakh.
 

Mr Sargsyan, what is your political evaluation of the Armenia-Turkey relations? What has changed in the past 23 years since Turkey unilaterally closed its land and air border with Armenia?

The Armenia-Turkey relations are totally frozen today, as we neither conduct official talks nor pursue the Track II Diplomacy. There isn’t any social or public dialogue, with no third country offering its mediation to contribute to a normalization. Given that the past 25 years have nonetheless seen certain steps undertaken (the Armenia-Turkey protocols, mutual presidential visits, reconciliation or rapprochement commissions initiated by different individuals), there aren’t any processes today - either official or semi-official or even public. Hence the Armenia-Turkey relations – which never practically existed before – have not been frozen so much as they are today.

What will be the impact of the April war, and to what extent do the two processes stand apart from each other?

The four-day active war operations will certainly have their impact on not only the Armenia-Turkey relations but also the entire region. Hence, our diplomacy must do everything possible to avoid associating the issue with other problems. The Armenia-Turkey relations must not be tied to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh or the international recognition of Genocide or any other issue. This is a separate problem, which must be settled without any precondition or consideration of third countries’ interests.

What prevents Turkey from negotiating with Armenia without preconditions, and is that possible at all in the foreseeable future?

A hampering factor for Turkey is Azerbaijan, its “younger brother”, as well as the phobia to confront the dark pages of its history or the personality of a political figure like [President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan. Once Turkey is able to overcome those complexes or at least distinguish things in between, the process may gain ground.

Is the German Bundestag’s Armenian Genocide resolution likely to produce its negative impact on the Armenia-Turkey relations? And is it likely to serve as a contagious precedent for other European countries?

As I have already said, the Armenia-Turkey relations should not, under any circumstances, be tied to the international recognition of Genocide or third countries’ interests. As to the second part of the question, I think that Germany’s example (as the EU’s political and economic locomotive) has already been contagious for the Czech Republic. So this process will be ongoing.