Richard Giragosian: Lavrov's statements on Karabakh are important not only for what they say but also for what they do not say

Hripsime Hovhannisyan

In an interview with Tert.am, Director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC) Richard Giragosian elaborated Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's recent statement on Nagoorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), calling attention to unuttered messages between the lines.

Mr. Giragosian, why do you think Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov decided to cover the details of the negotiations now? Do you see any pressure by Russia upon the Armenian authorities?

As we have clearly seen, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov issued some controversial comments in a public forum in Moscow on the morning of 21 April.  More specifically, Lavrov responded to a question regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process by explaining that for many years, negotiations have “envisaged a movement toward a resolution on the basis of a phased approach, with the first step the solution of the most pressing problems, the liberation of several regions around Nagorno Karabakh and the opening up of transportation, economic, and other ties.”

Those comments were significant for several reasons.  First, the most obvious importance of these comments related to the substance of his comments, demonstrated by his reference to a “phased” or step-by-step approach and his reliance on the need for the “liberation of several regions.”  These statements are important not only for what they say, but also for what they do not say. For example, while technically true, as the years of deadlocked and fruitless negotiations have often included a discussion and debate of these points, the comments fail to mention that these points were never agreed upon but rather, more of reflection of a one-sided demand by Azerbaijan.  In addition, the comments also fail to note that the consideration of a package deal, rather than an incremental “phased” approach, was equally common throughout the talks.  Thus, the Russian minister’s comments represent the use of “selective memory” and a reliance on an “edited narrative” that does little to contribute to an honest assessment of the peace talks.

Beyond the importance of the substance of the comments, Lavrov’s response was also significant for their timing, coming just hours before the videoconference between the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers. The timing of the comments also reveals a deeper agenda, as Lavrov is a professional diplomat, meaning that he knows that his comments, especially as a mediator of the conflict, would only have a negative impact on the talks. Therefore, the Russian role as a mediator is questioned by the obvious pro-Azerbaijani stance of the comments, suggesting that this was yet another instrument of pressure by Moscow on Yerevan.

Moreover, the Russian comments seemed to blatantly ignore the April 2019 round of talks in Moscow where the joint statement reached in that meeting reflected no direct reference or any implication of a “phased resolution’ to the conflict. This aspect was clearly pointed out by Armenian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Anna Naghdalyan’s interview with the Russian Kommersant newspaper on 23 April.

Third, the comments were further significant beyond the Russian pressure because they also put Armenia on the defensive, forcing Armenian Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan to defend the Armenian negotiating strategy by reiterating that “there will be no one-sided compromises” and stressing that “the top priority for the Armenian sides is security. As for the territory that Lavrov mentioned, it is among other things a security belt and defensive line. In no way could Armenians even imagine endangering the security of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh.”

But perhaps most interesting was the fourth factor that made these comments significant: the reaction in Baku. Surprisingly given the pro-Azerbaijani slant to the comments, the reaction within Azerbaijan was an unexpected attack directed against their own Foreign Minister, Elmar Mammadyarov, accusing him of being “too weak” in his dealing with Armenian Foreign Minister for allegedly responding too weakly to Mnatskanyan.

Do you think the Armenian authorities have their own plan for reaching a final settlement?

From a broader perspective, an assessment of the Armenian position and strategy over the Artsakh issue reveals two specific trends.  The first clear trend that defines Armenian diplomacy in the peace process is consistency.  Despite the change of government in 2018, the strategy of the Pashinyan government remains ironically similar and close to the Serzh Sarsgyan Administration.  Although this is also seen as a reflection of Prime Minister Pashinyan’s promises to not change the country’s strategic orientation or foreign policy, the consistency in foreign policy and diplomatic strategy over Artsakh is both a reflection of the fact that fundamental national interest remains the same and a reaffirmation that the foreign policy over the conflict by former President Serzh Sargsyan’s government was sound and serious. Further, as we see, Azerbaijan remains committed to a “maximalist” approach to the peace process, with little difference from their engagement with the previous Armenian government. The Armenian objectives of returning Artsakh to the negotiations, and the strategic recognition of security as a priority, are neither very different nor less clear than the previous Armenian diplomatic approach.

The second trend in Armenia’s management of the peace process is different, however. What is different in this case is the external context and the internal situation. More specifically, the external situation is new, driven by a much less interested and even less engaged United States under President Trump, and defined by an increasingly unreliable Russia, which through both veiled support for Azerbaijan and greater arms sales to Baku, represents a daunting and destructive development.

At the same time, for the Pashinyan government, the internal dynamic is also new, with much greater attacks and criticism from domestic political opponents and from political figures in Karabakh itself who are much less confident of support from the current Armenian government. While the political attacks on the government within Armenia have become an essential arena for opponents to seek political dividends from accusing the Pashinyan leadership of being weak or indecisive, the perception in Karabakh of vulnerability and insecurity is more important and suggests a dangerous divide between Stepanakert and Yerevan.  

Looking forward, I am neither particularly concerned nor optimistic over the state of the peace process, however.  On the one hand, the degree of innovative and dynamic diplomacy on the Armenian side bolsters my confidence in the Armenian government and explains my confidence in the Armenian foreign minister and his team.  And that makes me less concerned and certainly not in agreement with the domestic criticism.  But on the other hand, I am not optimistic as the outlook for the peace process remains poor, for two main reasons. First, as long as Artsakh is excluded from the peace talks as a direct party to the conflict, there can be little real expectation of any breakthrough or progress. And second, as long as Azerbaijan maintains its “maximalist” position in the negotiations, demands everything and offering little, then the danger is that the risk of renewed fighting and force of arms will replace the necessity for dialogue and diplomacy.  

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The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh broke out in 1988 when the Armenian majority of the then autonomous region declared its intention to break away from Azerbaijan. In a referendum held on December 10, 1991 (days before the collapse of the USSR), the population voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence (99.89%). The move was followed by Azerbaijan’s large-scale military operations against Nagorno-Karabakh and seven neighboring regions. The armed violence left around 25,000-30,000 people dead; thousands were internally displaced. The Ceasefire Accord, which went into effect in May 1994, formally put an end to the armed attacks in the conflict zone. Since 1994, the OSCE Minsk Group, a mission co-chaired by France, the United States and Russia, has been spearheading the efforts towards  a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 

The hostilities escalated to an unprecedented degree in April 2016 into what was later dubbed a Four-Day War. In the early hours of April 1, 2016, Azerbaijan's armed forces launched heavy offensives along the Line of Contact,  provoking large-scale confrontations with the Defense Army of Nagorno-Kkarabakh. The adversary also shelled civilian settlements, particularly the southern and north-eastern regions of Hadrut and Marakert.

A ceasefire was reached on 5 April between the chiefs of the armed forces of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Moscow. The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities also welcomed the verbal agreement.