Armenian analyst explains motives behind EP resolution

15:57 • 24.10.13

In an interview with Tert.am, Karen Bekaryan, the president of the European Integration NGO, addresses the European Parliament’s recent resolution, focusing on the factors that he thinks might have caused the EU parliamentarians to adopt a measure conflicting with the interests of Armenia. The analyst attributes the decision to three major factors: Azerbaijan’s “caviar diplomacy”, the existing discontent with Armenia’s Customs Union move and the continuing “club and pancake” policies in relation to Azerbaijan. Bekaryan says it would be better for the Armenian ambassadors accredited to different European states to gather together in Yerevan one day to agree upon future policy lines and developments


Mr Bekaryan, we now hear opinions that the European Parliament’s resolution, which is not quite pro-Armenian, is the EU’s revenge on the Armenian president’s statement on the Customs Union membership.


If we address the resolution or rather its part concerning [Nagorno-]Karabakh, I think there are different factors that we may encounter. The first, which isn’t something new, is the Azerbaijani lobby’s activities and their influence on different organizations, particularly the parliamentarians. This is what is normally considered ‘caviar diplomacy’.


The second essential factor, to my mind, is that we repeatedly witness what can be termed as “club and pancake” policies by the European organizations, especially in parliamentary formats. On the one hand we see very big criticism over the elections in Azerbaijan, and on the other hand – because they avoid provoking a very aggressive reaction and a decline in the relations etc. – they seem to be balancing that with the part regarding Karabakh. And the third, I think, has to do with parliamentary formats, i.e. - the “September 3” [when President Sargsyan made the landmark statement on the CU accession] has not been fully and comprehensively perceived. If we address specific provisions in the resolution, there are several elements there, which require attention. If we see a problem with territorial integrity in the case of Georgia, with Abkhazia and Ossetia not being separate [states], the same is the case with Moldova. Hence there is ‘no’ Karabakh as far as Azerbaijan and Armenia are concerned. It has been separated. Along with the UN resolutions and the abnormal terming. “occupation”, a reference is made to the L’Aquila statement. Combining them with one another, it is very hard to perceive the real intention. So, there are lots of things which aren’t absolutely normal.


Does this in general testify to a certain degree of non-competence or do they frighten us with what we may return to? And is a return possible at all? Is there such a practice of returning to documents adopted in any other organization, the UN, for instance, after a twenty-year interval?


There are developments which we must perceive as a fact. The question, at this point, has to do with the European parliamentarians and their understanding. It is, of course, possible to raise the competency issue, but to expect parliamentarians from so many states to have a competent approach or attitude would be naivety. And that isn’t something that has to do only with us and our problems; that problem exists globally, and it is characteristic of parliamentary bodies. This is one aspect of the issue.


The other thing is the summary of the three factors I presented. There is another issue here: we have to think of our future steps but not under the influence of haste or responses made in force majeure situations. I don’t mean that. We have to clearly realize the public perceptions in Europe, particularly on the part of parliamentarians. They do not perceive all this, so we have to realize that and take proper efforts in this direction.


It would be very good, for instance, for our ambassadors accredited to Europe to come to Yerevan to check watches with one another and to understand the future course of developments. It would be very good, probably, for our parliamentarians working with European partners in different European organizations to take more active efforts and carry out certain work with their colleagues in a more intensive manner than they do now.


What implications can we talk about? There don’t seem to be legal ones, as is normally the casem but can that position become predominant in European organizations in future?


There aren’t legal implications, of course, but that isn’t something that should leave us with a feeling of relief, lulling us into a false sense of security. That’s a political statement, be it as it may, and it does create a political background.


May that resolution endanger the signing of the document between Armenia and the EU, establishing “other formats of cooperation”?


I don’t think so. There is anyway a body responsible for that process, which is the executive, the European Commission. It is possible to point to a couple of more essential facts: a month before September 3, the European Commission issued the statement saying the negotiations with Armenia had been successfully completed, and the country was ready for the initialing of the Association agreement. That is, the official position reflects more that than what the European Parliament said. But I repeat, there will be by all means a background effect.